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Appointment of Thomas A. Cromwell
to the Supreme Court of Canada*
Peter W. Hogg**

I. INTRODUCTION
When I was asked to prepare a paper on the process for the
appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada of Justice Thomas
Cromwell, it was assumed that the process would include a public
hearing by a parliamentary committee in which the nominee would
appear publicly before the committee, would make a statement to the
committee and would respond to questions by members of the
committee. This was the big innovation in the process of appointing
Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Court in 2006.1 What happened,
however, was that the projected parliamentary hearing for the Cromwell
appointment was delayed by the dissolution of Parliament, an election
and a prorogation of Parliament; and eventually the government decided
to appoint Justice Cromwell without holding the parliamentary hearing.
However, it is still the policy of the Conservative government of Prime
Minister Stephen Harper — and it is a policy that is likely to be followed
by successor governments — to hold a parliamentary hearing on future
nominations to the Court. Therefore, it still seems worthwhile to reflect
on the process of appointment, including the usefulness of the parliamentary
hearing, as well as describing the process that was actually followed for
the Cromwell appointment. That is what this paper attempts to do.
*

I disclose that I was retained by the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs to provide
advice and assistance in the process of appointment as needed, and to participate in the hearing
before the parliamentary committee. Since no hearing took place, there was little call for my
services. This paper was written long after the retainer ended, and, to the extent that the paper goes
beyond the recitation of facts, it represents only my personal views and not those of the
Commissioner or anyone else in the Government of Canada.
**
Peter W. Hogg, C.C., Q.C., Scholar in Residence, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP,
Toronto; Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I acknowledge
the help of Professor John Whyte, who read and commented on an earlier version of the paper.
1
See P.W. Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 527. Some of the points made in that article are repeated in
this one.
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II. THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The appointment of judges to the Supreme Court of Canada is
provided for in the Supreme Court Act.2 It is not provided for in the
Constitution Act, 1867,3 section 96 of which provides only for the federal
appointment of judges to the provincial superior, district and county
courts. That is because no Supreme Court was established in 1867. The
framers were content for the Privy Council to continue to serve as the
final court of appeal for Canada. However, by section 101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, they did provide a power for the Parliament of
Canada to establish a “general court of appeal for Canada”. That was
done in 1875, when the original Supreme Court Act was enacted,
establishing the Supreme Court of Canada.4 The Court originally had
only six judges; a seventh was added in 1927 and two more were added
in 1949 to bring the Court up to the current complement of nine.5
All that the Supreme Court Act says about the appointment of judges
is that the appointments are to be made by “the Governor in Council”.6
That term normally means the cabinet. In the case of judges of the
superior courts of the provinces, section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867
gives the appointing power to “the Governor General” and the convention
that has developed is that Chief Justice appointments are made on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister and puisne judge appointments
are made on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice. In the case of
the Supreme Court of Canada, however, it seems likely that the Prime
Minister is normally involved in the appointments of the puisne judges as
well as the Chief Justice. In the case of the appointment of Justice
Rothstein, Prime Minister Harper made clear that the final decision was
going to be made by him, and (after the public hearing) it was made by
him. In the case of the appointment of Mr Justice Cromwell, the
announcement of his nomination was made in a joint statement by Prime
Minister Harper and Justice Minister Rob Nicholson7 and the announcement

2

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4.
30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.), c. 3.
Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, S.C. 1875, c. 11.
5
The history is related in P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Carswell,
2007, annually supplemented), ch. 8.
6
Supra, note 2, s. 4.
7
Press Release, Office of the Prime Minister (September 5, 2008).
3
4
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of his appointment (including the reason for not holding a public hearing)
was made by Prime Minister Harper alone.8

III. THE PROCESS OF APPOINTMENT BEFORE 2004
The Supreme Court Act makes no provision for ratification of
appointments by the Senate or House of Commons or by a legislative
committee. And, until 2004, no aspect of the appointment process was
public. It was understood that the Minister of Justice would consult with
the Chief Justice of Canada and with the Attorneys General and Chief
Justices of the provinces from which the appointment was to be made,9
and with leading members of the legal profession, but this was all
informal and confidential.
This informal process seems to have been very effective in winnowing
out unsuitable appointees, and successive Canadian governments, regardless
of party, have consistently made appointments to the Court of people that
were regarded by the legal profession as fully worthy of the appointment.
In particular, successive governments have not seen appointments to the
Court as an opportunity to reward faithful supporters of the party in
power or as an opportunity to pack the Court with judges who will render
decisions pleasing to the party in power. Obviously, governments have
welcomed the praise that their Supreme Court appointments have attracted.
It has been good politics to make good appointments.

IV. THE APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICES CHARRON AND ABELLA IN 2004
In 2004, Irwin Cotler, who was the Minister of Justice in the Liberal
government of Paul Martin, introduced a more transparent process to
find the replacements for Justices Louise Arbour and Frank Iacobucci
(both from Ontario), who retired in that year. He appeared before the
Standing Committee on Justice of the House of Commons and presented
the names of his nominees for the replacements, who were Justices
Louise Charron and Rosalie Abella of the Court of Appeal of Ontario,
and he answered questions posed to him by the Committee about the
8
Kirk Makin, “Top-court appointment bypasses review process”, The Globe and Mail
(December 22, 2008) [hereinafter “Makin”].
9
The practice is for three judges to be appointed from Quebec (a requirement of the
Supreme Court Act), three from Ontario, two from the Western provinces and one from the Atlantic
provinces. When a judge retires or dies, a replacement is found from the region that the former judge
came from.
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search process that had been gone through and about the qualifications of
the nominees. The nominees themselves did not appear before the
Committee. After the Minister‟s appearance, the two nominees were
appointed.

V. THE APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICE ROTHSTEIN IN 2006
Justice John Major (from Alberta) retired from the Supreme Court in
2005, and the Minister of Justice (still Mr. Cotler) announced a new and
more elaborate process that would be used to fill the vacancy. The new
process would start with the Minister‟s normal informal consultations
with the Attorneys General, Chief Justices and leading members of the
legal profession. The Minister would then submit a short list of five to
eight candidates to an Advisory Committee composed of a Member of
Parliament (or Senator) from each recognized party in the House of
Commons, a nominee of the provincial Attorneys General, a nominee
of the provincial law societies and two prominent Canadians who were
neither lawyers nor judges. They would review the files of the
candidates, and provide the Minister with a short list of three names from
which the appointment would be made. All of this would take place on a
confidential basis. However, the final step would be public. That would
be the appearance by the Minister of Justice (but not the appointee)
before the Standing Committee on Justice to explain the selection
process and the qualifications of the person selected.
This process was duly commenced to fill the Major vacancy. The
Minister appointed an Advisory Committee and submitted six names to
the Committee. The Committee reviewed the names and came back with
a short list of three names. But, on November 29, 2005, before the
government had made the final selection, it was defeated in the House of
Commons and Parliament was dissolved for the election that took place
on January 23, 2006. In that election, the Liberal government of Paul
Martin was defeated, and the Conservative government of Stephen
Harper was installed. One of the policies of the new government was a
public, parliamentary interview process to review nominations to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The new Conservative Minister of Justice, Vic Toews, was left with
the unfinished business of finding a successor to Justice Major. Instead
of starting the entire process anew, the Minister decided to work from the
short list provided by the Advisory Committee appointed by the previous
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government. The Prime Minister, no doubt in consultation with the
Minister of Justice, chose one candidate from that list. That candidate
then had to submit to the new public interview process. The government,
with the agreement of all the party leaders, established an “Ad Hoc
Committee to review a Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada”. The
Committee consisted of 12 MPs drawn from each party in proportion to
their standings in the House of Commons (five Conservative, four
Liberal, two Bloc Québécois, one NDP). The Minister of Justice, who
was one of the Conservative members, was the chair of the Committee.
His predecessor, Mr. Cotler, was one of the Liberal members.
The Committee held a three-hour televised hearing in the Reading
Room, Centre Block, Parliament Buildings, on Monday, February 27,
2006. The name of the nominee, Justice Marshall Rothstein of the
Federal Court of Appeal, had been made public the previous Wednesday,
and members of the Committee had been supplied with a dossier which
included his curriculum vitae, a list of all of his decisions, four sample
opinions in full, a list of his publications and four sample publications in
full. The hearing took from 1:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. It opened with a short
introduction of the nominee and the process by the chair (the Minister),
then with opening remarks by me (legal counsel to the Committee), then
with opening remarks by Justice Rothstein, then with questions from the
members of the Committee, then with a closing statement by me and a
closing statement by the chair. During the question period, Justice
Rothstein was asked approximately 60 questions in two rounds of
questioning (three per member on the first round, two per member on the
second round); and the Committee elected not to continue for a third
round.
The Committee did not prepare a written report. The proceedings
were watched on television by the Prime Minister, and no doubt the
Minister of Justice reported to him. As well, at the conclusion of the
hearing, the Minister invited the members of the Committee to
communicate their views directly to the Prime Minister. The result was a
foregone conclusion in that the nominee‟s credentials, his statement to
the Committee and his answers to questions left no doubt as to his
suitability for appointment, and the reaction of the Committee members
left no doubt that they would advise the Prime Minister to proceed with
the appointment.
The Prime Minister had announced that he would make his decision
the following Wednesday, March 1, two days after the hearing. And on
that day he announced in a written statement that he had selected the
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nominee and would recommend him for appointment by the Governor in
Council. Justice Rothstein was duly appointed, and was sworn in as a
justice of the Supreme Court of Canada on March 6, 2006.

VI. THE APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICE CROMWELL IN 2009
Justice Michel Bastarache (from New Brunswick) retired from the
Supreme Court in 2008, and, after the announcement of the retirement, in
May 2008 Justice Minister Rob Nicholson announced that he would
carry out the normal consultations in the Atlantic provinces, compile a
list of names and submit it to a selection panel comprised of five
members of Parliament — two from the government caucus and one
from each of the three opposition parties. The panel would provide a
confidential list of three names to the Prime Minister. The person chosen
by the Prime Minister would then appear before a parliamentary
committee for questioning by members of Parliament.10 However, on
September 5, 2008, Prime Minister Harper and Justice Minister
Nicholson jointly announced that the work of the selection panel was
“suspended” (terminated would have been more accurate) “because of
Opposition objection to the panel‟s composition”, and they announced
that Justice Thomas A. Cromwell, a judge of the Court of Appeal of
Nova Scotia, would be the government‟s nominee for the appointment.11
However, the Prime Minister said that “an appointment will not be made
until Mr Justice Cromwell has an opportunity to answer questions from
an ad hoc all-party committee of the House of Commons”.12
Two days later, Prime Minister Harper called an election and
Parliament was dissolved. The election was held on October 14, 2008,
and Prime Minister Harper was re-elected, although still with a minority
government. On November 18, Parliament opened, but, on December 4,
Parliament was prorogued until January 26, 2009. During the period of
prorogation (on December 21, 2008), the Prime Minister announced that
Justice Cromwell would be appointed immediately without the scrutiny
of a parliamentary committee. By this time, the Supreme Court had been
10
The process leading to the appointment of Cromwell J. is described in Philip Slayton,
“Ottawa‟s Best-kept Secret?”, Maclean’s (January 20, 2009), at 20 [hereinafter “Slayton”].
11
Press Release, Office of the Prime Minister (September 5, 2008). According to Slayton,
id., the opposition members of the panel objected to the fact that the Government members of the
panel were Cabinet ministers who, it was claimed, would not approach their task with the
independence of regular members of Parliament.
12
Press Release, id.
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without its full complement for six months, which is a problem for a
nine-judge court that usually sits as a full panel of nine. The Prime
Minister explained the immediate appointment by saying that “the Court
must have its full complement of nine judges in order to execute its vital
constitutional mandate effectively”. He also explained that this appointment
was an exception, and that future Supreme Court nominees would
undergo parliamentary scrutiny.13 Justice Cromwell was duly appointed
and was sworn in as a justice of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2009.

VII. THE PARLIAMENTARY HEARING
1. Should It Continue?
Although no parliamentary hearing was held on the Cromwell
nomination, that omission was caused by the special difficulties of the
minority Parliament in 2008, and, as I have related, the Prime Minister
said that future Supreme Court nominees would undergo parliamentary
scrutiny. So it is clear that, for the Conservative government, parliamentary
hearings will continue to be part of the Supreme Court appointment
process. If the government were to change before the next Supreme
Court vacancy, it is likely that a Liberal government would also hold
hearings. As explained, the Liberal government had moved a long
distance in that direction before it lost office, and the Liberal opposition
had participated fully and constructively in the Rothstein hearing. It
would be politically difficult for a federal government to revert to a more
confidential process, and I think it would be a mistake to do so.
I will discuss the Rothstein hearing in more detail later in this paper,
but it certainly established that Canadian parliamentarians can conduct a
civil hearing that poses no danger of politicizing the judiciary or of
embarrassing the nominee. It is true that in 2006 the stars were
particularly well aligned for a peaceful hearing since the nominee had
been drawn by a Conservative government from a short list prepared by a
committee set up by a Liberal government and on which all parties were
represented. But the political parties in Canada, unlike the Republican
and Democratic parties in the United States, have not defined themselves
primarily by reference to issues that have been decided by their courts,
such as abortion, same-sex marriage, religion in schools and due process
13

Makin, supra, note 8.
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protections for persons charged with crime. Nor have Canadian Prime
Ministers, unlike the American Presidents (who at least on the Republican
side, are perfectly open about their intentions),14 ever made any effort to
pack the highest court with their supporters. Americans would no doubt
be surprised to learn that the Canadian judges do not display the
ideological voting patterns of the judges of the American Supreme Court,
and that the political party of the appointing Prime Minister has little or
no correlation with the voting patterns of the Canadian judges.15 In the
case of Justice Cromwell, for example, he had been appointed to the
Court of Appeal of Nova Scotia by the federal Liberal government. The
fact that he was then appointed to the Supreme Court by a Conservative
government surprised no one and occasioned no public comment.
Canadian politicians may be no more virtuous than American politicians,
but when strong candidates are proposed for appointment there is simply
no reason for the Canadian hearings to take on the partisan and rancorous
atmosphere of American confirmation hearings.
Canadian hearings are advisory only, because neither the Supreme
Court Act nor the Constitution provides any formal role for Parliament.
This lowers the temperature in Canada, because in the end the
Government has the power, if it chooses, to insist on the appointment of
its nominee. In the United States, by contrast, the Constitution requires
the appointment of a Supreme Court justice to be made by the President
only with the advice and consent of the Senate.16 The Senate can block
the appointment, and, for the reasons already given, the Senators who do
not belong to the President‟s party often perceive that they have a
political incentive to strive mightily to do so. Moreover, in the United
States, unlike Canada, there does not seem to be an institutionalized
process of consultation administered within the federal government to
ensure that nominations are always of high quality, so that in some cases
14
The original court-packing plan was devised by a Democrat, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, to overcome the destruction of his New Deal at the hands of an ultra-conservative
Supreme Court, which believed that measures such as minimum wages or limitations on hours of
work, let alone the New Deal programs to combat the Depression of the 1930s, were contrary to the
Bill of Rights. After the swing judge on the nine-man Court changed his mind in 1937, the so-called
Lochner era ended without the implementation of the expansion of the Court that had been proposed
by the President. A period of judicial restraint ensued, but decisions in the 1960s and 1970s on issues
such as abortion, contraception, pornography, desecration of the flag, religion in the schools and
rights of criminal defendants raised the ire of conservatives, introducing a new round of hostility to
the Court and open demands for the appointment of more conservative judges.
15
B. Alarie & A. Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus and Ideology
at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 475.
16
Constitution of the United States, Art. II, s. 2(2).
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there is legitimate concern about the quality of a Presidential nominee.
When this occurs, Senatorial opposition becomes more bipartisan, and
this can lead to the defeat or (more usually) the withdrawal of the
nomination.
The prospect of a public hearing operates as a deterrent to a
government that is considering making a partisan appointment of a
poorly qualified person. This has not been necessary in Canada in the
recent past, where the diligence of the Government of Canada‟s routine
informal process of consultation has yielded consistently strong
appointments. It is to be hoped that Canadian governments will continue
to believe that it is good politics to make good appointments.
Presumably, as well, governments will not care so intensely about the
decisions of the Court that they will want to influence future decisions
through the appointment process. I have already made the point that the
“wedge issues” in Canadian political debate tend not to be decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada. As well, we have a weaker form of
judicial review in Canada under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms17 than the strong form of judicial review in the United States.
Judicial decisions striking down laws on Charter grounds usually leave
room for a legislative response and usually get a legislative response that
accomplishes the objective of the law that was struck down.18 Court
packing and court bashing are not as necessary in Canada as they are
perceived to be by American politicians.
If the impulse to hold public hearings to interview Supreme Court
nominees does not stem from any concerns about the quality of the
people nominated or the suspicion of court-packing motives on the part
of government, what is the basis for it? I think it is really the democratic
notion that important decisions should be transparent. Decisions that are
taken in secret, based on confidential consultations, will inevitably be
less acceptable than those that are more open. Based on comments in the
press and many comments made to me personally after the hearing for
Justice Rothstein, lay people as well as lawyers were interested to receive
some real information about the work that Supreme Court judges do,
17
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
18
The Charter explicitly permits legislatures to enact limits on Charter rights (s. 1) and even
to use a notwithstanding clause to override Charter rights (s. 33). The common phenomenon of
Charter decisions being followed by legislative sequels is the subject of a considerable literature
focusing on the idea of “dialogue” between courts and legislatures. For a recent contribution, see
P.W. Hogg, A.A. Bushell Thornton and W.K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — Or Much Ado
About Metaphors” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
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including the way in which cases come to the Court, the materials that
have to be studied for each case, the hearing at which all parties‟
arguments are heard and tested, and the way in which judges try to reach
decisions that are faithful to the law and the facts. It was also interesting
to see a judge answer questions about his career and his work, which sent
a reassuring message about the industry, ability and integrity of the
person who was about to join the Court.19
People are interested in appointments to the Court. This is demonstrated
by the experience of the existing judges, each of whom on appointment
was bombarded with questions and requests for interviews by the media.
There is much to be said for getting this over in the form of a structured
public hearing before appointment. The hearing, which is broadcast on
television and reported on by the print media, is inevitably more
thorough and informative than the story that any one journalist can
realistically expect to obtain on his or her own.
In summary, I think that future public hearings will undoubtedly
carry significant benefits in helping Canadians to understand the
appointment process and the judicial function and to learn about the
qualifications of the person nominated for appointment. And, although
nominations to the Canadian Court have in the past been of wellqualified people, I do not dismiss the value of the hearing as a deterrent
to the nomination of someone who is not well qualified. The retention of
counsel for the committee, the development of informal guidelines as to
what can and cannot be answered by the nominee, and the willingness of
committee members to respect the guidelines, as well as the dignity and
privacy of the nominee, are features of the 2006 process that should be
able to be repeated in future. With these understandings in place, judicial
independence is not threatened by public hearings.
2. What Form Should the Hearing Take?
I have already briefly described the form that the Rothstein hearing
took. It was by no means all questions and answers, since the Chair (the
19
It is possible to exaggerate the transparency of a process that culminates in a public
hearing. The candidate does not know, and the hearing will not disclose, what considerations moved
the government to choose the candidate over other well qualified persons. However, each
appointment will have unique elements, and considerations of practicality and confidentiality
probably make it unrealistic for public information to go beyond information about the role of judges
on the Court, the search process and the qualifications of the particular candidate. And these, I
suggest, are the truly important matters.
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Minister of Justice) made brief opening and closing statements, I made
an opening statement and a short closing statement. Justice Rothstein
made an opening statement. However, the bulk of the time was occupied
by questions from the committee members and answers by Justice
Rothstein.
The protocol followed by the Ad Hoc Committee was that the
members of the Committee were free to ask any questions they wanted.
My role was to provide guidance to the Committee as to the kinds of
questions that could or could not be answered by the nominee. At the
hearing, I made an opening statement to the Committee explaining what
their role was and what were the appropriate limits of judicial speech. I
then remained with the nominee at the hearing in case any questions
arose that I could help with. (In fact, I was asked two questions by
members of the Committee, one on practices in other Commonwealth
countries, the other on the wisdom of a special constitutional court.)
The questions at the hearing ranged far and wide, but were always
civil and respectful, and Justice Rothstein‟s courtesy and good humour
kept it all very pleasant. He was adept at handling the questions. He was
asked what he thought about expanding the Supreme Court to 11
members to allow more representation from the West. He replied that he
would be in favour of it if he did not make it this time! Although the
Committee members understood the limits of judicial speech, they could
not resist asking some questions on top-of-mind policy issues, like crime
in the cities, gun control and the elimination of poverty. And each time,
Justice Rothstein said something about the validity of the concern and
concluded by saying something like “that‟s your issue, not mine.” I
observed that, without exception, the questioner seemed perfectly happy
with this response.

VIII. GUIDELINES FOR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
In my opening statement to the Rothstein parliamentary committee,20
I attempted to describe the work that the Supreme Court does and the
role of judges on the Court. Among other things, I pointed out that “In
the appeals that reach the Supreme Court of Canada, there is the further
complication that the law itself is usually unclear.” In that case, “the
judges have to decide what the law is, as well as how it applies to the

20

The full text is to be found as an appendix to Hogg, supra, note 1.
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facts of the case”. I suggested some guidelines about questions that the
nominee could or could not answer.
One category of questions that I said the nominee could not be
expected to answer were these:
He cannot express views on cases or issues that could come before the
Court. He cannot tell you how he would decide a hypothetical case. He
might eventually be faced with that case. For the same reason, he
cannot tell you what his views are on controversial issues, such as
abortion, same-sex marriage or secession. Those issues could come to
the Court for decision in some factual context or other. Any public
statements about the issues might give the false impression that he had
a settled view on how to decide those cases — without knowing what
the facts were, without reviewing all the legal materials, and without
listening to and weighing the arguments on both sides. 21

Phillip Slayton, who described me as “lecturing the committee about
what it should and should not do”, criticized this particular restriction on
the basis that: “These questions [about cases or issues that could come
before the Court] were, of course, the very ones that most people wanted
answered.”22 I doubt that “most people” wanted answers to questions that
might ultimately come before the Court, since it is rather obvious that a
judge must not give the impression of having predetermined the answer
to questions that might come to him or her later for decision. As John
Whyte commented,23 the answer to such questions “might lead to the
inference that the nominee was making decision commitments in exchange
for approval, which would be a stark abridgement of the rule of law”. It
would also be an abridgment of judicial independence if a judge was not
free to approach every case coming before him or her with an open mind
and listen attentively to the arguments on both sides of the case. It may
be that Mr. Slayton did not intend his criticism to be taken seriously; in
any event, it should not be taken seriously.
No one on the committee asked Justice Rothstein a question about a
hypothetical case or issue that might come before him on the Court.
The only other category of question that I said could not be answered
is the question of why he had, in his previous life as a judge, decided a
particular case in a particular way. I explained that a judge is limited to
his or her written reasons for judgment in explaining a decision that he or
21

Id.
Slayton, supra, note 10, at 21.
J.D. Whyte, “The Supreme Court from the Outside” (2006) 13 Policy Dialogue (Sask.
Institute of Public Policy) (Fall 2006), at 14 [hereinafter “Whyte”].
22
23
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she has reached; a judge cannot supplement the written record with oral
explanations. No one on the committee asked this category of question
either.
On the positive side, I suggested that the committee “might want to
explore” the nominee‟s personal qualities of wisdom, fairness, compassion,
diligence, open-mindedness and courtesy. Professor Whyte24 interpreted
my remarks as excluding the exploration of other issues than these
personal qualities. But in fact there were no restrictions of any kind on
questioning, and, in the realm of answering, I had no intention of
excluding other matters, and no one on the Committee interpreted my
remarks in that fashion. Virtually none of the 60 questions directly
addressed any of the personal qualities that I had listed, although no
doubt Committee members drew some conclusions about those personal
qualities from the way in which Justice Rothstein answered questions on
other topics. As explained earlier, the questions ranged over a broad
range of topics. These included a number of questions about his judicial
philosophy and his ideas of legitimate legal reasoning, for example, his
attitude to criticism of the activism of the current Supreme Court. And all
of these questions were courteously and carefully answered by the
nominee. The only questions he did not answer — and he did this very
graciously and to the evident satisfaction of each questioner — were
questions about appropriate public policies on crime, gun control and
poverty, which were clearly matters for the legislature, not for judges.
Michael Plaxton25 made a similar criticism to Professor Whyte. He
also interpreted my remarks as intending to limit the questioning to the
list of personal qualities that I claimed a judge should possess, which he
described as “a politically and morally thin conception of the sort of
person the committee should seek out”.26 However, Professor Plaxton
implicitly acknowledged that no one on the Committee had recognized
any limitation on the questioning, because he went on to quote from the
questions posed by the committee that he thought were intended to draw
out the “political and moral values” that Justice Rothstein would bring to
his decision-making on the Supreme Court. He then moved on to
criticize the answers offered by Justice Rothstein, who implicitly denied
that his personal philosophy would influence his decision-making and
expressly denied “that judges should be advancing the law with a social
24
25
26

Id.
M. Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis and the Rothstein Hearing” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 92.
Id., at 96.
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agenda in mind”.27 According to Professor Plaxton, the members of the
Committee were also at fault in that “they simply chose not to require
anything more than superficial answers” to their questions about judicial
method.28 By taking this approach, “the Committee quietly endorsed the
neutrality thesis, acting as though the judge‟s political stances selfevidently have no bearing on adjudication, even in constitutional cases”;
the result was a “flawed process” that “positively misled Canadians
about the nature of the judicial function”.29
In somewhat similar vein, Professor Whyte was disappointed that
there was no discussion at the Rothstein hearing of “the constitutional
philosophy or the moral authority that will lie behind his judicial
development of constitutional meaning”, “questioning that might have
illuminated constitutional philosophy”, “what values Justice Rothstein
saw the constitution bringing to Canadian political society”, “explorations
of judicial philosophy and constitutional values” and “theories of
interpretation with respect to a national constitution”.30 I have already
made the point that there was nothing in the proceedings to restrict such
questions, and in fact a number of questions dealt with his approach to
deciding cases. In thinking about why these kinds of questions were not
properly explored, we have to remember that a parliamentary committee
is composed of people of various backgrounds and interests, many of
them without a sophisticated understanding of constitutional law, and it
would not necessarily occur to them that these questions were a valuable
way of assessing credentials for a Supreme Court appointment.31 As
well, it is worth remembering that the majority of the Court‟s case load is
non-constitutional law: criminal law, administrative law, civil procedure,
remedies, contract, tort, property, tax, and so on. These cases may not be
as important to the public policy of the country as constitutional cases,
but the parliamentary committee is aware that the judges have to decide
the non-constitutional cases wisely too. That is why, when you come
right down to it, it is the personal qualities of wisdom, fairness,
compassion, diligence, open-mindedness and courtesy that are the most
27

Id., at 101.
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important things which, on top of a distinguished legal career, qualify a
person for the Supreme Court of Canada.
The criticisms of the hearing process by Professors Whyte and
Plaxton, although strongly worded, were not, I am sure, intended to drive
the country away from holding public hearings. They just wished that the
questions and answers had been more penetrating and frank in
acknowledging that judges make new law when they interpret an
instrument as open-ended as a charter of rights, and that in hard cases a
judge‟s moral and political views are bound to have an influence on
decision-making. These points, however commonplace they have
become to lawyers (and especially to academic lawyers), are subtle ones
that are not easy to bring out in a public, parliamentary hearing without
giving the false impression that the Court is just another branch of
government where policy is the driving influence. Stephen L. Carter, a
professor of law at Yale University, commenting on the American
nomination hearings, has suggested that: “Every time we claim to be
focusing the nation‟s attention on crucial questions of constitutional
philosophy, what we really do is reinforce the notion that the justices are
somehow there to do „our‟ bidding, to reflect „our‟ values in their
votes.”32 Justice Rothstein‟s insistence that he, like his fellow judges, felt
constrained by legal texts, precedents and the established principles of
the legal system was also articulating an important point about the
judicial function. Judges are not supposed to decide cases according to
their reading of public opinion, or their own personal predilections, and
they must do their best to keep an open mind on each case that comes
before them. That understanding may be unsophisticated, even
“superficial”, but it is surely a useful part of a public assessment of the
qualities that should be possessed by a judge of the Supreme Court.

IX. CONCLUSION
The insertion of open parliamentary scrutiny at the end of what is a
careful, but confidential, process of finding people to serve as judges of
the Supreme Court of Canada is likely to continue for future appointments,
despite its suspension for the appointment of Justice Cromwell. The
process gives the public some insight into the work of the Court and the
role of the judges, and introduces the nominee to the public. It is a
32
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safeguard against the nomination of a poorly qualified person, although
past experience suggests that this is less likely to occur here than it is in
the United States. Nor is the partisan rancour that now characterizes
nomination hearings in the United States likely to disfigure Canadian
hearings, because the issues that divide Canada‟s political parties do not
include the decisions of the Supreme Court, and partisan squabbles can
safely be set aside for nomination hearings in Canada. I believe that the
civility and courtesy that marked the hearing for the nomination of
Justice Rothstein would also have characterized a hearing for Justice
Cromwell had one been held.

